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Perception,	cognition,	and	delusion		
Abstract:		Firestone	and	Scholl’s	(F&S)	critique	of	putative	empirical	evidence	for	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception	focuses	on	studies	of	neurologically	normal	populations.	We	suggest	that	a	comprehensive	exploration	of	the	cognition-perception	relationship	should	also	incorporate	work	on	abnormal	perception	and	cognition.	We	highlight	the	prominence	of	these	issues	in	contemporary	debates	about	the	formation	and	maintenance	of	delusions.			
Main	text:		 “The	matter	of	belief	is,	in	all	cases,	different	in	kind	from	the	matter	of	sensation	or	presentation,	and	error	is	in	no	way	analogous	to	hallucination.	A	hallucination	is	a	fact,	not	an	error;	what	is	erroneous	is	a	judgment	based	upon	it”	(Russell,	1914,	p.	173).	“Perceiving	is	believing”	(Fletcher	&	Frith,	2009,	p.	48).	Firestone	and	Scholl	(F&S)	present	a	stimulating	critique	of	putative	empirical	evidence	for	the	cognitive	penetrability	of	perception.	In	making	their	case,	however,	they	focus	exclusively	on	research	on	perception	and	cognition	in	neurologically	normal	populations.	In	doing	so,	they	neglect	potentially	important	sources	of	informative	data	afforded	by	research	on	abnormal	perception	and	cognition.	Cognitive	neuropsychology	and	cognitive	neuropsychiatry	are	scientific	disciplines	that	draw	inferences	about	aspects	of	normal	cognition	(such	as	reading,	object	recognition,	belief	formation,	reasoning,	decision	making,	and	theory	of	mind)	by	studying	patients	with	cognitive	deficits	(Coltheart,	2007).	We	suggest	that	a	comprehensive	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	perception	and	cognition	should	consider	research	from	these	disciplines.	In	particular,	we	demonstrate	that	the	issue	of	cognitive	penetrability	looms	large	in	contemporary	debates	about	the	formation	and	maintenance	of	delusions.			According	to	the	Two	Factor	theory	of	delusions,	two	distinct	factors	are	causally	responsible	for	the	formation	and	maintenance	of	delusions	(Coltheart,	Langdon,	&	McKay,	2011).	The	first	factor	explains	why	the	content	of	a	delusional	belief	comes	to	mind,	while	the	second	factor	explains	why	the	belief	is	adopted	rather	than	rejected.	To	date,	the	Two	Factor	theory	has	focused	on	explaining	specific	monothematic	delusions	(delusions	with	one	theme)	associated	with	neurological	damage,	but	some	tentative	suggestions	have	been	made	concerning	how	the	Two	Factor	theory	might	explain	polythematic	delusions	(delusions	with	multiple	themes)	associated	with	psychiatric	illnesses	such	as	schizophrenia	(Coltheart,	2013).			Consider	Capgras	delusion,	a	monothematic	delusion	in	which	a	patient	believes	that	a	spouse	or	close	relative	has	been	replaced	by	an	impostor.	This	delusion	is	thought	to	stem	from	disruption	to	the	autonomic	component	of	face	recognition,	such	that	familiar	faces	are	recognized	as	familiar	but	feel	
unfamiliar.	Empirical	support	for	this	hypothesis	comes	from	studies	that	have	found	that,	unlike	control	participants,	patients	with	Capgras	delusion	do	not	show	a	pattern	of	autonomic	discrimination	(indexed	by	skin	conductance	response)	between	familiar	and	unfamiliar	faces	(e.g.,	Brighetti,	Bonifacci,	Borlimi,	&	Ottaviani,	2007;	Ellis,	Young,	Quayle,	&	de	Pauw,	1997;	Hirstein	&	Ramachandran,	1997).	Other	work,	however,	suggests	that	an	anomalous	autonomic	response	to	familiar	faces	is	not	sufficient	for	the	development	of	Capgras	delusion.	Tranel,	Damasio,	and	Damasio	(1995)	studied	patients	with	damage	to	ventromedial	frontal	regions	of	the	brain	who	also	failed	to	show	a	pattern	of	autonomic	discrimination	between	familiar	and	unfamiliar	faces,	yet	were	not	deluded.		According	to	Two	Factor	theorists,	Capgras	patients	and	Tranel	et	al.’s	(1995)	ventromedial	frontal	patients	share	a	common	first	factor:	anomalous	autonomic	responses	to	familiar	faces.	What	distinguishes	them	is	that	Capgras	patients	have	a	second	anomaly:	a	cognitive	deficit	in	the	ability	to	evaluate	candidate	beliefs.	Analogous	Two	Factor	accounts	have	been	offered	for	several	other	monothematic	delusions	(Coltheart	et	al.,	2011).	Importantly,	all	Two	Factor	accounts	are	predicated	on	a	conceptual	distinction	(and	empirical	dissociation)	between	perception	and	cognition:	abnormal	perception	as	the	first	factor	and	a	cognitive	belief	evaluation	deficit	as	the	second	factor.	Furthermore,	Two	Factor	accounts	are	not	committed	to	perception	being	cognitively	penetrable,	meaning	that	the	Two	Factor	theory	is	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	presented	by	F&S.			In	contrast	to	the	Two	Factor	theory,	the	Prediction	Error	theory	of	delusions	holds	that	delusion	formation	and	maintenance	are	caused	by	a	single	factor:	aberrant	processing	of	prediction	errors	(mismatches	between	expectations	and	actual	inputs).	In	particular,	delusions	are	conceived	as	attempts	to	accommodate	inappropriately	generated	prediction	error	signals	(Corlett,	Taylor,	Wang,	Fletcher,	&	Krystal,	2010;	Fletcher	&	Frith,	2009).	Prediction	Error	theorists	have	tended	to	focus	on	delusions	associated	with	schizophrenia,	but	they	have	also	offered	accounts	of	monothematic	delusions	associated	with	neurological	damage	(Corlett	et	al.,	2010).	Whereas	the	distinction	between	perception	and	cognition	is	critical	for	the	Two	Factor	theory,	Prediction	error	theorists	minimize	or	disavow	this	distinction:			 “The	boundaries	between	perception	and	belief	at	the	physiological	level	are	not	so	distinct.	An	important	principle	that	has	emerged	is	that	both	perception	of	the	world	and	learning	about	the	world	(and	therefore	beliefs)	are	dependent	on	predictions	and	the	extent	to	which	they	are	fulfilled.	This	suggests	that	a	single	deficit	could	explain	abnormal	perceptions	and	beliefs”	(Fletcher	&	Frith,	2009,	p.	51).	“Within	this	framework	there	is	no	qualitative	distinction	between	perception	and	belief,	since	both	involve	making	inferences	about	the	state	of	the	world	on	the	basis	of	evidence”	(Frith	&	Friston,	2013,	p.	5).	Furthermore,	according	to	Prediction	Error	theorists	delusions	provide	examples	of	cognition	penetrating	perception:	there	exist	“interactions	between	perception	and	belief-based	expectation”	(Corlett	et	al.,	2010,	p.	357)	and	
“delusional	beliefs	can	alter	percepts	such	that	they	conform	to	the	delusion”	(Corlett	et	al.,	2010,	p.	353).	This	position	seems	to	be	in	tension	with	the	hypothesis	presented	by	F&S.	Consequently,	we	suggest	it	would	be	useful	for	F&S	to	expand	the	scope	of	their	review	by	critically	examining	whether	there	is	empirical	evidence	from	research	on	delusions	that	cognition	penetrates	perception.	If	empirical	evidence	is	compelling,	then	there	exists	a	counter-example	to	F&S’s	hypothesis.		In	this	commentary	we	have	shown	that	the	relationship	between	cognition	and	perception	is	a	major	point	of	interest	in	contemporary	research	on	delusions.	This	suggests	that	evidence	from	cognitive	neuropsychology	and	cognitive	neuropsychiatry	may	play	an	important	role	in	testing	the	hypothesis	presented	by	F&S.					
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